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Clark: Grinberg v Safir

SUPREME COURT
MONROE COUNTY

Grinberg v. Safir'
(decided May 18, 1999)
Pursuant to the newly implemented New York City vehicle
forfeiture laws, petitioner Grinberg's vehicle was seized during his
Driving While Intoxicated (hereinafter "D.W.I.") arrest.2 Grinberg
demanded the return of his car by letter and commenced a
proceeding to invalidate the City's policy by claiming that the
taking and retention of his car was unconstitutional because it was
an unreasonable seizure,3 constituted an excessive fine,4 and
181 Misc. 2d 444, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
Id at 447, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 319. His arrest was made pursuant to NY VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 1192 (Consol. 1999) which states in pertinent part:
2. Driving while intoxicated; per se. No person shall operate
a motor vehicle while such person has .10 of one per centum
or more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood as shown
by chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or
saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven
hundred ninety-four of this article.
3. Driving while intoxicated. No person shall operate a motor
vehicle while in an intoxicated condition.
Id
3 U.S. CONST. amend. 4. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12. This section provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
2
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violated his Due Process rights5 under both the Federal and New
York State Constitutions.6 The New York Supreme Court, New
York County, held that the City D.W.I. forfeiture policy does not
violate the Due Process, Search and Seizure, or Excessive Fine
clauses7 of the Federal or State Constitutions.
On February 20, 1999, Police Commissioner Safir announced
that the Property Clerk Forfeiture Law (hereinafter "Forfeiture
Law") would apply to vehicles operated by individuals arrested for
D.W.I. 8 incNew York City. On February 21, 1999, Mr. Grinberg
was stopped and arrested for D.W.I. while driving within the city
limits. 9 A breathalyzer test confirmed that his blood alcohol
content was, in fact, over the legal threshold."° As a result, his

Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. 8. This amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." Id
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 5. The article states: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted, nor shall witnesses unreasonably be detained." Id.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. 14. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent
part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. This section states:
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in
civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against
him.. .No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
Id.
6 Grinberg, 181 Misc. 2d at 451,453,457, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 322, 323, 326.
7 Id. at 453,457, 459, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 323,326, 327.
8 Id. at 447, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
9
Id.
'0 Id. at 447, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 320 (stating that "the breathalyzer indicated 0.11
per cent blood alcohol content, over the 0.10 per cent intoxication threshold").
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vehicle was taken under the newly implemented Forfeiture Law."
On February 26, 1999, Mr. Grinberg's attorney wrote a letter
demanding that the car be returned to Mr. Grinberg.'"
On March 9, 1999, the petitioner, Mr. Grinberg, commenced this
proceeding by an order to show cause and petition against New
York City in an attempt to have the law invalidated. 3 On March
19, 1999, the Property Clerk commenced a separate action against
the petitioner for a judgment declaring the vehicle forfeited as the
instrumentality of Mr. Grinberg's crime of D.W.I. 4
At trial, Mr. Grinberg argued three different Federal and New
York State Constitutional violations." The first claim was that the
taking and retention of his car was tantamount to unreasonable
seizure.16 The court evaluated both the Federal 7 and State 8 Search
and Seizure Clauses in the same manner.' 9 Mr. Grinberg asserted
that even if the seizure of his car did not violate the Federal
Constitution, it was unconstitutional on state grounds because a
heightened level of scrutiny should be applied in state cases.' Mr.
Grinberg relied on the holding in People v. P.J Video, 2' where the
Court of Appeals held that a heightened level of scrutiny was
necessary to analyze the facts in a case involving the first
took petitioner's 1988 Acura for forfeiture").
Grinberg,181 Misc. 2d at 447,694 N.Y.S.2d at 319-20.

" Id (explaining that "[o]fficers
17

13

Id at 447-48, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 319-20.

14 Id at 448, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 320 (stating that the "property clerk must cause a
civil forfeiture proceeding or other similar civil proceeding to be initiated before
or within 25 days of a claimant's demand").
Is Grinberg, 181 Misc.2d at 451, 453, 457, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 323, 326, 327
(bringing claims of unreasonable search and seizure, that the seizure was a
violation of his Due Process rights, and that the seizure was an excessive fine).
16 Id at451, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
'7 U.S. CONST. amend. 4. See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
18 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12. See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
19 Grinberg, 181 Misc. 2d at 451 n.6, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316 (explaining that the
circumstances presented here must be analyzed the same way under federal and
New York constitutional law).
' See People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 501 N.E.2d 556

(1986) (stating that the court should depart from the Federal rule of law and

analyze the facts under a heightened level of scrutiny because the case involved
obscenity and the First Amendment as well).
21 Id.
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amendment. In the instant case, the court did not rely on People v.
P.J. Video because First Amendment claims were not implicated in
this case.'
Further, the court here held that not only did the seizure of Mr.
Grinberg's car not violate either the Federal or State Constitutions,
but that the seizure was reasonable under three different theories.2 3
These theories were the plain view theory,' the theory that it was
incident to the arrest,' and the theory granting an automobile
exception.26 Thus, the court found that although all of those bases
2 See People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 308-09, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16, 501
N.E.2d at 564.
2 Grinberg,181 Misc. 2d at 451,694 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
u People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 110, 612 N.E.2d 298, 301, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940
(1993). The court explained:
[I]f the sight of an object gives the police probable cause to
believe that it is the instrumentality of a crime, the object may
be seized without a warrant if three conditions are met: (1) the
police are lawfully in the position from which the object is
viewed; (2) the police have lawful access to the object; and (3)
the object's incriminating nature is immediately apparent.
Id.
See also People v. Horton, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37(1990).
' See People v. DeSantis, 46 N.Y.2d 82, 87, 385 N.E.2d 577,412 N.Y.S.2d 838
(1978). The DeSantis court held that:
one of these exceptions, of course, allows for a warrantless
search of a person and the objects within his access incident to
his lawful arrest. ... the practical impetus for allowing these
searches lies in the fact that the arrests itself constitutes such a
major intrusion into the privacy of the individual that the
encroachment caused by. a contemporaneous search of the
arrestee and his possessions at hand is in reality de minimus.
Id.
See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
26 People v. Blaisich, 73 N.Y.2d 673, 678-79, 541 N.E.2d 40, 543 N.Y.S.2d 40
(1989). The Blaisich court explained that:
where the police have validly arrested an occupant of an
automobile, and they have reason to believe that the car may
contain evidence related to the crime for which the occupant
was arrested or that a weapon may be discovered or a means
of escape thwarted they may contemporaneously search the
passenger compartment, including any containers found
therein.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss2/41

4

Clark: Grinberg v Safir

2000

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

applied, even one of them would have been sufficient to conclude
that the seizure of the vehicle was constitutional. 7
The second constitutional claim raised by the petitioner was that
the seizure of his car violated his Due Process rights.' s Mr.
Grinberg asserted that his Federal" and State3° Due Process Rights
were violated when he was not afforded a pre- or post-seizure
hearing although the police were allowed to take and retain his
vehicle 3 ' because, he argued, that in order for the police to take and
keep his vehicle, he was entitled to a hearing. Under federal
analysis,
[T]he general rule, of course, is that absent an
'extraordinary situation' a party cannot invoke the
power of the state to seize a person's property
without a prior judicial determination that the
seizure is justified. But [the court has] previously
held that such an extraordinary situation exists
when the government seizes items subject to
2
forfeiture.
The court recognized that although the Due Process Clauses are
similar, the New York State clause has occasionally been given a
wider scope. 3 Unlike the Federal Constitution, the New York
State Constitution's Due Process Clause does not include any
See also Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938,940 (1996).
' Grinberg,181 Misc. 2d 444,451,694 N.Y.S.2d 316, 322 (1999) (stating that
"[t]he seizure was reasonable under three theories: plain view, incident to arrest
and the automobile exception").
28 L at 453,694 N.Y.S.2d at 323.

9 U.S. CONST. amend. 14. See supranote 5 and accompanying text.
30
31

N.Y.CONST. art. 1, §6. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Grinberg,181 Misc. 2d at 453, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 323.

1 United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars in U.S.
Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 563, n12 (1983).
33 Grinbergat 457, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 326 (explaining

that "while the federal and
state Due Process clauses are similar, our state clause occasionally has been
accorded wider scope"). See also Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d
152, 159, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1173, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978) (stating that "on
innumerable occasions this court has given our State Constitution an
independent construction, affording the rights and liberties of the citizens of this
State even more protection than may be secured under the United States
Constitution").

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [2000], Art. 41

692

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 16

language that requires State action before an individual may find
refuge in its protections. 4
The court determined that the seizure of the vehicle in a D.W.I.
arrest was necessary because it was a mobile instrumentality of the
crime committed.35 In this case, the court held that there was a
sufficient tie between the crime and the property, which created the
justification for the forfeiture of the car.36 However, in this
instance, "neither federal nor state due process requires a pre- or
post-seizte evidentiary hearing- for seizure and retention of D.W.I.
vehicles for forfeiture during pendency of the criminal action."37
The final constitutional claims, brought under both Federal38 and
New York State 39 Constitutions by Mr. Grinberg, ° was that the
seizure of his car was an excessive fine.4 The court stipulated
initially that both the Federal and State Excessive Fine Clauses
required the same analysis with the New York clause providing no
greater protection than the federal clause. 42 In Austin v. United
States, the Supreme Court ruled that if even part of a forfeiture is
' Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d at 160, 379 N.E.2d at 1173, 408
N.Y.S.2d at 42 (1978).
3- Grinberg at 455, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 325 (stating that "while the City's DWI
policy prevents accused drunk drivers from using property before a
determination in the criminal action, the City's interest in deterring drunk
driving and ensuring enforceability of a subsequent forfeiture order, clearly
outweighs the private interest affected").
36 Id. at 456, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 326. Stating in pertinent part:
Retention prevents the vehicle from being used for repeated
illegal activity. An automobile is an integral part of DWI; it
poses the threat of being used as an "instrumentality of death"
should the crime be repeated... Just as there is a strong public
interest in withholding a non-contraband murder weapon from
a homicide defendant, there is a strong public interest in
withholding a car from a DWI defendant. Id.
3 Grinberg, 181 Misc. 2d at 457, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
38 U.S. CONST. amend. 8. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
39 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, §5. See supranote 4 and accompanying text.
4 Grinberg, 181 Misc. 2d at 457, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
41id.

Id. (explaining that "New York's Excessive Fines clause requires the same
analysis as the federal, and provides no greater protection ....There is no
42

evidence that incorporating the Eighth amendment text into the State
Constitution in 1846 evinced a different meaning or scope.").
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serving to punish, the forfeiture needs to be analyzed as to whether
it is an excessive fine 4
Here the court conceded that although the forfeiture could be
considered a fine, it was definitely not excessive when analyzed
under any of three tests for measuring excessiveness: the
proportionality, instrumentality, and mixed "proportionalityinstrumentality" tests.' In applying the proportionality test, 45 the
court concluded that since the crime of D.W.I. has a first offense
maximum sentence of one year in jail, a fine of one thousand
dollars, and three years probation, or a combination of these plus
the loss of driving privileges, and since subsequent offenses are
considered felonies with up to four years of imprisonment, the
seizure of an eleven year old car with a value of $2,000 is not
disproportionate to the severity of the available sentence.'
In examining the instrumentality test, the court looks to whether
"the owner's role and his use of the property were temporally and
spatially coextensive with the offense charged.'" 7 As for the
instrumentality test,4 the forfeiture was not excessive because the
car was determined to be the instrument of the crime of drunk
driving and Mr. Grinberg is the owner of the car.49 Since the fine
was not considered excessive under eitherthe instrumentality test
or the proportionality test, it was clearly not excessive under the
See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610-11(1993).
"Grinberg, 181 Misc. 2d at 457, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
41
45

Id at 458, n.16, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 327, n.16 (stating that excessiveness is

measured "by whether the property's value is grossly disproportional to the
gravity of the offense"). See also U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 329 (1998)

(explaining that "[Tihe touchstone of constitutional inquiry under the Excessive
Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: the amount of the forfeiture

must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to
punish.").
4 Grinberg,181 Misc. 2d at 459, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
47 Id. at 457-58, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
41 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 628 (1993) (explaining that "the
question is not how much the confiscated property is worth, but whether the
confiscated property has a close enough relationship to the offense").
49 Grinberg, 181 Misc. 2d at 457-58, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 327 (determining that
"the petitioner's vehicle is the instrumentality of a charged crime, inseparable
from it, and its prerequisite. Petitioner owns the car and drove it at the time of
the alleged offense.").
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mixed instrumentality-proportionality
test.50
The court
consequently held that the D.W.I. forfeiture policy does not violate
the Excessive Fines Clause. 1
In conclusion, the Federal and New York State Constitutional
provisions are treated similarly with respect to the Due Process,
Search and cSeizure, and Excessive Fines clauses. Under the
federal or state analysis of all three clauses, the Court determined
that the City vehicle forfeiture law did not violate any of these
clauses. Under the New York City Vehicle Forfeiture Law,
vehicles can be seized and held in DWI cases without violating a
person's right to due process of the law, right to be free of illegal
search and seizure, or the imposition of excessive fines. Although
there may be a slight difference in the wording of some of the
clauses, under these particular facts, the court analyzed both

50

See U.S. v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 847-48 (1995). The court noted:

In our view, the factors to be considered by a court in
determining whether a proposed in rem forfeiture violates the
Excessive Fines Clause should include (1) the harshness of the
forfeiture (e.g. the nature and value of the property and the
effect of forfeiture on innocent third parties) in comparison to
(a) the gravity of the offense, and (b) the sentence that could
be imposed on the perpetrator of such an offense; (2) the
relationship between the property and the offense, including
whether use of the property in the offense was (a) important to
the success of the legal activity, (b) deliberate and planned or
merely incidental and fortuitous, and (c) temporally or
spatially extensive; and (3) the role and degree of culpability
of the owner of the property.
Id.
s' Grinberg, 181 Misc. 2d at 459, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 328 (holding that "the City's
DWI forfeiture policy does not violate the Excessive Fines Clause, as a matter of
law, either facially or as applied to petitioner's vehicle").
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federal and New York provisions in the same way, concluding that
there really was no difference in the federal and New York
applications of the clauses discussed.
Susan Clark
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